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 Since the landmark decision of Gideon vs Wainwright in the Supreme Court in 
1963, free legal counsel for indigent clients has been required for every state in the 
United States.  However, the reality looks very different than this ideal with indigent 
defense services across the country being under-resourced, under-funded and forgotten 
by many other than those that require their services.  This is happening in conjunction 
with the explosion of incarceration rates throughout the United States.  This study aims to 
explain the relationship between the levels of funding provided for indigent defense 
services and the rates of incarceration.  Using a multi-variate regression my study tests 
the per-capita funding for indigent defense services compared to the incarceration rates 
for 49 states and every county in Pennsylvania.  This study found for half of the results 
that a higher level of funding for indigent defense services does lead to a lower 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“You have the right to an attorney, if you cannot afford an attorney one 
will be appointed to you.” – Miranda rights (also every television show ever) 
 
 These words are etched into the mind of almost every television watching 
American citizen.  We hear them so often that it becomes easy to internalize these words 
as true and walk through life assuming that this right to legal counsel is ensured equally 
to all criminal defendants.   However, the reality of funding and access to free and 
effective legal counsel can be very different.  In a report on indigent defense services, 
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver rewrote this section of the Miranda Rights to say  
“You have the right to an attorney, if you cannot afford an attorney one will be 
provided for you … that attorney may have 300 other cases that he or she is 
working on, that’s not a joke, literally 300 other cases. They could potentially 
have a total of seven minutes to prepare your defense … That attorney may be 
exhausted not able to think straight, that attorney is likely to be grossly underpaid 
or working in an office crawling with cockroaches … that attorney may pressure 
you to take a guilty plea.  Statistically … there’s a 90 plus percent chance that you 
will take that guilty plea … and one other thing, that attorney that was provided 
for you may not be free.  If you lose you may have to pay ‘em, you might even 
have to pay the prosecutor.”  1 
 
 Oliver’s reporting represents the reality of indigent defense in our criminal justice 
system and serves as a call to examine what we see as true in this system with regards to 
the availability of adequate legal services for indigent clients and the long-term impact it 
 





has on communities in terms of the future of crime and incarceration.  The goal from the 
1963 Supreme Court in the case of Gideon vs Wainwright in mandating the availability of 
legal counsel was to ensure that every client no matter their financial situation has the 
ability to mount an effective defense against the prosecutors that charge them.  Indigent 
defense services are the (supposedly) free legal services provided to criminal defendants 
who are unable to afford private legal counsel.   
There are countless stories of indigent defense attorneys not being able to meet 
the demands and expectations of their clients and caseloads.  One of the best examples of 
this is the story of Crystal Weimer, a mother to three girls, who was accused of a crime 
she did not commit in Fayette County, Pennsylvania. 2  Weimer could not afford the 
50,000 dollars it would cost to mount her defense and therefore turned to what she saw as 
the best option for her, the Fayette County Office of the Public Defender. 3  Weimer, 
knowing that she was innocent, originally stated that she was not concerned about the 
outcome of her case but quickly realized that the patchwork system of indigent defense in 
Pennsylvania would let her down. 4  After she was arrested for a second time after having 
the charges dropped the first, she faced 30 years in prison for third-degree murder. 5  The 
prosecution in her case offered her a plea deal which a representative from the public 
defender’s office pushed her to accept. 6  She refused to do so however, stating that she 
would not admit to doing something she hadn’t done. 7  This refusal to accept a plea 
 
2 Preveti and Lazarski, “Wrongful Murder Conviction Points to Systemic Problems with Public Defense in 
Pennsylvania.” 
3 Preveti and Lazarski. 
4 Preveti and Lazarski. 
5 Preveti and Lazarski. 
6 Preveti and Lazarski. 





pushed Weimer to take her case to trial, and leaving her fate in the hands of a public 
defender who on average had two fewer months than their private counsel counterparts to 
prepare for similar cases. 8   
Weimer then spent two years in jail awaiting trial. 9  Despite all of this she 
continued to be hopeful about the outcome of her case, believing that because she was 
innocent, the jury would rule so. 10  Weimer was sentenced to 12-25 years in prison for 
this crime that she did not commit. 11  Her attorney was not surprised at this outcome 
stating, “I’m not going to beat myself up for this. I’ve been beating myself up for 33 
years on this, it’s not going to change until the state takes over the system — which I 
don’t see them ever doing – it’s not going to be a fair fight.” 12  This dejection is 
something that indigent defense attorneys across the country feel, that no matter the hours 
and effort they put in, they are so unevenly matched that, in many cases, it is difficult to 
see a world in which an indigent defendant is actually heard in criminal cases. 13 
Upwards of 80% of criminal defendants in the United States could be considered 
indigent. 14  This statistic points to many of the problems that we see in the United States 
Criminal justice system.  Such a dramatic number of people needing these services 
should imply that we would fund and pay more attention and respect to the people that 
take on this work.  However, these services are often the first on budget chopping blocks 
and the last thing we consider when talking about criminal justice reform and prison 
 
8 Preveti and Lazarski. 
9 Preveti and Lazarski. 
10 Preveti and Lazarski. 
11 Preveti and Lazarski. 
12 Preveti and Lazarski. 
13 Pfaff, Personal conversation. 





abolition.  Considering the fact that the United States has the largest prison population in 
the world, and these services are in such high demand for those accused of crimes, it 
ought to be impossible to attempt to reduce our incarcerated population without also 
talking about indigent defense services. 15   
This study aims to examine the relationship between the levels of funding for 
indigent defense services and the levels of incarceration in those communities that they 
represent.  I hypothesize that the higher the funding for indigent defense services, the 
lower the rate of incarceration.  I base this hypothesis on the idea that higher funding for 
indigent defense leads to these services having more access to more attorneys, 
investigators, and social workers. This allows for indigent legal representation to be 
better opponent to prosecutors which could cause lower incarceration rates as it creates 
shorter sentences as well as fewer wrongful convictions. 
 In order to test this hypothesis I ran a multivariate regression testing the 
relationship between the per capita funding for indigent defense services and the 
incarcerated population from cases across the country.  This study will be divided into 
five chapters, the first being this introduction.  In Chapter two I will analyze and 
summarize the relevant literature surrounding indigent defense services and incarceration.  
Chapter three is an overview of my methodology and variables used.  In Chapter four, I 
outline my results and discuss the implications.  Finally, Chapter five summarizes 








Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 This chapter will address the state of the current literature regarding the question 
of how the level of funding for indigent defense services affects the rates of incarceration 
in those same communities.  I will begin with an overview of the literature on indigent 
defense services and the current state of those services as they exist in real time.  I will 
then move to the state of the literature on mass incarceration.  I will end with a discussion 
of the brief literature on the two variables together and the gaps that exist in the literature 
as a whole. 
 
Funding for Indigent Defense Services 
 The right of the criminally accused to a defense attorney in a criminal proceeding 
is and has been ensured since the sixth amendment was added to the constitution. 16  
However, this right did not extend to court appointed lawyers for the poor in every 
criminal case until the landmark supreme court case of Gideon vs Wainwright in 1963. 17  
Before Gideon the only case considering criminal defense for indigent clients was Powell 
vs Alabama in 1932. 18  Powell was a case in which nine Black men were accused of 
raping two White women on a train. 19  These men, described as “young, ignorant, and 
illiterate” could not afford an attorney for their defense and were sentenced to death in an 
Alabama court. 20  At the time, Alabama law required appointed counsel for capital cases 
but the attorneys in the case did not meet with their clients before the trial and for the 
 
16 Justia, “The Right to a Public Defender Overview : Justia.” 
17 Justia. 







most part, merely appeared in court as opposed to mounting an effective defense. 21  The 
question in this case was to discern whether the legal representation was unconstitutional 
with regards to the Due Process Clause, which ensures the fair trial for all citizens in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 22  The court ruled with the petitioner finding, that when a client 
as was the case for the defendants is unable to mount their own defense it is the duty of 
the government to provide an effective defense for those defendants. 23   
This question was then left silent in the courts until Gideon was argued in 1963. 24  
In this case, Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida state court with felony 
breaking and entering. 25  Upon arriving to court without an attorney Gideon requested 
that the court provide one for him. 26  However, Florida law only provided attorneys to 
defendants in capital cases and Gideon was found guilty and sentenced to five years in 
prison. 27  Gideon filed a habeas corpus petition stating that the lack of an attorney 
violated his constitutional right to an attorney. 28  The outcome of this case ruled that the 
assistance of counsel is imperative in order for a defendant to have a fair trial which 
resulted in the conclusion that, in all criminal proceedings if the defendant could not 
afford an attorney they would be provided one by the government, becoming an 
important section of the Miranda rights listed to all people when arrested. 29  Since 















counsel for the poor. 30  However, with no central federal regulations or standards, the 
system for providing these legal services varies dramatically across states and can often 
fall short of what is necessary. 31 
 
Where states stand currently 
 After the Supreme Court mandated that legal services be provided for indigent 
clients, states were left to create their own systems leading to a patchwork system across 
the United States that is often inadequate in representing clients.  There are four delivery 
systems (sometimes referred to as implementation systems) for indigent legal services 
across the United States: staffed public defenders, contract attorneys, assigned counsel, 
and mixed or county based systems. 32   
Staffed public defenders are public employees whose job consists solely of 
representing indigent clients. 33  Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, Wyoming all use a staffed 
public defender system. 34  A study commissioned by the National Institute of Justice 
found that staffed public defense attorneys tended to have marginally lower conviction 
rates than contracted or assigned attorneys for certain homicide cases. 35  The authors 




32 BJS, “Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) - Indigent Defense Systems”; Gideon at 50, “Gideon at 50 - 50th 
Anniversary of Gideon vs. Wainwright.” 
33 Pfaff, Personal conversation. 
34 Gideon at 50, “Gideon at 50 - 50th Anniversary of Gideon vs. Wainwright.” 





more often than the attorneys from the other implementation systems they develop a 
better relationship than private attorneys and are able to yield a more favorable outcome 
due to their knowledge of prosecutorial styles. 36  The makeup of these offices can vary 
dramatically based on the funding that is allocated to them. 37  For example, the Office of 
the Public Defender in Rockville, Maryland hosted attorneys, social workers, assistants, 
and immigration specialists.  However, this funding is distributed very unevenly between 
the counties. 38  The office in Rockville was able to afford all of the personnel listed 
above, but smaller, more rural areas see a disturbing lack of funding and personnel which 
forces them to adopt increasingly high caseloads and decreased services to their clients. 39 
Contract attorneys are private attorneys who work with states or county 
governments on a contractual basis to represent a certain number of indigent clients. 40  
Additionally, these attorneys generally carry a full caseload of private clients in addition 
to their indigent ones. 41  The only state that uses a fully contract attorney system is 
Oregon. 42  Studies on contract attorneys have yielded mixed results but the main 
consensus is that the attorneys sustaining a full practice can lead to less favorable results 
on trial outcomes (i.e. a higher conviction rate). 43  A study on indigent defense systems 
found that “contract attorneys often maintain a private practice in addition to their 
assigned clients, which can lead to excessive caseloads and may favor paying clients, 
potentially resulting in less quality representation for those requiring public defense 
 
36 Anderson and Heaton. 
37 Owens et al., “Indigent Defense Services in the United States, FY 2008–2012 – Updated.” 
38 Capital News Service, “Public Defenders Bear Uneven Burden.” 
39 Capital News Service. 
40 Pfaff, Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration and How to Achieve Real Reform. 
41 Pfaff, Personal conversation. 
42 Gideon at 50, “Gideon at 50 - 50th Anniversary of Gideon vs. Wainwright.” 





services.” 44  This inability to ensure a parity in the quality of representation between 
paying and indigent clients poses a large problem to contract attorney implementation 
system.  
Assigned counsel systems generally consist of private attorneys being appointed 
by the court to represent indigent clients. 45 Assigned counsel differs from contract 
attorney implementation systems in that instead of the state having contracts with 
individual attorneys the state keeps a list of attorneys and the judge assigns attorneys 
either in a systematic or ad hoc basis. 46  The ad hoc assignation system is one in which 
the attorney is assigned almost arbitrarily and often assigned solely upon who is in the 
courtroom during a defendants first appearance in court. 47  These attorneys are generally 
paid hourly for their own work but must petition the court for more funds to pay for 
investigators, expert witnesses, or any other costs relevant to building an effective 
defense. 48  The other method of assigning counsel for indigent clients is the systematic or 
coordinated assigned counsel program. 49  These generally involve some kind of 
oversight body who sets standards that attorneys must meet in order to be admitted to the 
program. 50  This system is the one preferred by the American Bar Association as it 
creates a better system for guaranteeing quality of defense. 51  The states that use assigned 
counsel programs are Alabama, Maine, and Massachusetts. 52 These attorneys face a 
multitude of problems but the issue of a conflict of interest is particularly worrying; 
 
44 Taylor. 
45 US Legal, “Assigned Counsel Law and Legal Definition | USLegal, Inc.” 
46 Spangenberg and Beeman, “Indigent Defense Systems in the United States.” 
47 Spangenberg and Beeman. 
48 Spangenberg and Beeman. 
49 Spangenberg and Beeman. 
50 Spangenberg and Beeman. 
51 Spangenberg and Beeman. 





“appointed counsel are impeded by conflicts of interest on the part of both the appointing 
judges and the appointed counsel, limited compensation, incentives created by that 
compensation, and relative isolation.” 53  This conflict of interest can be very detrimental 
to the conviction rates for attorneys and the jail time and trial outcomes for indigent 
clients.  
Finally, mixed or county based systems use a mix of the above implementation 
systems to provide services to the indigent. 54  Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
Washington, and West Virginia all use mixed implementation models. 55  These mixed 
implementation systems can vary from the majority of the state using one implementation 
system with a few exceptions to initial trials using one implementation system while 
appeals are handled by another.  For example, Pennsylvania funds and implements their 
indigent defense services on a completely county based method, meaning that each 
county has a slightly different program. 56  In Pennsylvania, each county has a “Chief 
Public Defender” and this is the only oversight that the counties indigent defense services 
have. 57  In fact, some counties only employ that Chief Public Defender for every 
indigent client in the county. 58  Philadelphia County, the largest county in Pennsylvania, 
 
53 Anderson and Heaton, “Measuring the Effect of Defense Counsel on Homicide Case Outcomes.” 
54 Pfaff, Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration and How to Achieve Real Reform. 
55 Gideon at 50, “Gideon at 50 - 50th Anniversary of Gideon vs. Wainwright.” 
56 Owens et al., “Indigent Defense Services in the United States, FY 2008–2012 – Updated.” 
57 Gideon at 50, “Gideon at 50 - 50th Anniversary of Gideon vs. Wainwright.” 





has a Chief Public Defender that oversees the long standing contract system with the 
Defender Association of Philadelphia, a non-profit legal defense firm. 59 
Where the funding for these different implementation systems creates another 
opportunity for variation in indigent defense across the country.  There are 24 states that 
fund indigent defense completely from the state budget and state generated funds. 60  
There does not seem to be a single unifying factor or trend between these states other 
than their funding system for indigent defense that would predict this behavior or string 
them together in a narrative that concerns indigent defense funding.  The other popular 
method for funding distribution for indigent defense is a mix of funding contributions 
from local (usually county) and the state government. 61  The states that do this mixed 
funding system can range from a state like Arizona receiving 99% of the indigent defense 
funding from the county with and a 1% contribution from the state to something like the 
Wisconsin system with almost the complete opposite with 93% of the indigent defense 
funding coming from the state and 7% coming from the county. 62   
Pennsylvania is the only state in the country that funds completely by the county 
level. 63  This solely county funded system does pose many problems to the kind of legal 
representation that comes from indigent defense systems.  County budgets for the most 
part are funded through property taxes, which, especially in a state like Pennsylvania with 
such high demographic and economic variance, can result in a huge disparity in the level 
of funding given to each state. 64  Counties with low property taxes and low demand for 
 
59 Gideon at 50. 
60 Gideon at 50. 
61 Gideon at 50. 
62 Gideon at 50. 
63 Gideon at 50. 





indigent defense services can be as poorly staffed as counties with high property taxes 
and high demand. 65  The funding match per capita for counties with lower property taxes 
can at times be in even more need for funding in indigent defense cases, “a rural county, 
with fewer resources, may be financially crippled by the need to fund the defense of a 
single homicide case.” 66  This inability to represent an indigent client in a single 
homicide case is in blatant violation of the ruling of Gideon but there is not a reform in 
sight of Pennsylvania politics to address this problem.  There has not been much attention 
to this fact in any Pennsylvania news media however.  In research for this project, there 
were only three relatively high profile pieces on the issue.  One entitled “Despite outlier 
status PA lawmakers don’t make public defense a priority” outlines exactly the level of 
apathy from the Pennsylvania legislature towards fixing the problem despite having 
commissioned a report that came back with scathing results in 2011. 67 
 
Where does funding goes when defense is funded well 
 The most glaring answer to where additional funding would go would be to pay 
the salaries of additional attorneys to handle increasingly oppressive caseloads.  
However, there are a multitude of other necessities for these offices to create an effective 
defense for clients. 68  In a study of indigent defense throughout the United States 
 
65 Lefstein and Spangenberg, “Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right 
to Counsel.” 
66 Lefstein and Spangenberg. 
67 Meyer, “Despite Outlier Status, Pa. Lawmakers Don’t Make Public Defense a Priority.” 
68 Taylor, “System Overload: The Costs of Under- Resourcing Public Defense”; Lee, Ostrom, and Kleiman, 
“The Measure of Good Lawyering: Evaluating Holistic Defense in Practice”; Frederique, Joseph, and Hild, 
“What Is the State of Empirical Research on Indigent Defense Nationwide? A Brief Overview and 
Suggestions for Future Reseach”; Lefstein and Spangenberg, “Justice Denied: America’s Continuing 





researchers compiled a description of what sufficient funding for indigent defense 
services would accomplish or look like. 69 
“Resources, in the broadest sense, can include funding, time, training, 
investigative services, independence and oversight. All of these are intertwined 
and not easily disentangled. For example, a well-funded public defense system is 
likely to be able to hire more public defenders, which in turn, will reduce 
caseloads and give defenders more time on each case. At the same time, an 
adequately funded agency with independence and oversight has control over how 
those resources are used. A lack of independence and other structural problems 
further contribute to struggling public defense systems.” 70 
A study of legal offices in general show how the most effective defense does not look 
only at the immediate situations of clients but looks at the case as a holistic process to 
address all factors of the defendants life, aptly namely holistic defense. 71 Though holistic 
defense is a relatively new term and has not been studied extensively, elements of it that 
make for more effective indigent defense have been represented in the literature. 
 The first is the fact that higher funded indigent defense systems tend to have 
lower caseloads per attorney which can lead to an overall better level of defense. 72  The 
American Bar Association created a publication with the standards that should be upheld 
in order for indigent defense to be considered effective; 
1. The public defense function, including the selection, funding, and payment of 
defense counsel, is independent.  
2. Where the caseload is sufficiently high, the public defense delivery system 
consists of both a defender office and the active participation of the private bar.  
 
69 Taylor, “System Overload: The Costs of Under- Resourcing Public Defense.” 
70 Taylor. 
71 Lee, Ostrom, and Kleiman, “The Measure of Good Lawyering: Evaluating Holistic Defense in Practice.” 
72 Frederique, Joseph, and Hild, “What Is the State of Empirical Research on Indigent Defense Nationwide? 





3. Clients are screened for eligibility, and defense counsel is assigned and notified of 
appointment, as soon as feasible after clients’ arrest, detention, or request for 
counsel.  
4. Defense counsel is provided sufficient time and a confidential space within which 
to meet with the client.  
5. Defense counsel’s workload is controlled to permit the rendering of quality 
representation.  
6. Defense counsel’s ability, training, and experience match the complexity of the 
case.  
7. The same attorney continuously represents the client until completion of the case.  
8. There is parity between defense counsel and the prosecution with respect to 
resources and defense counsel is included as an equal partner in the justice 
system.  
9. Defense counsel is provided with and required to attend continuing legal 
education. 
10. Defense counsel is supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and 
efficiency according to nationally and locally adopted standards. 73 
 
These standards concern themselves mostly with ensuring that effective representation is 
guaranteed by the attorneys having enough time and resources to adequately represent 
their clients. 74  This is particularly relevant when considering the caseloads of indigent 
defense attorneys.  As a supplement to these standards the American Bar Association 
released caseload standards of what would be the maximum amount of cases an attorney 
could work on and still provide their clients with an effective defense. 75  The A.B.A. 
 
73 American Bar Association, “Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System.” 
74 American Bar Association. 






cited a report titled Justice Denied: America’s Continued Neglect of Our Constitutional 
Right to Counsel summation of the problem with excessive caseloads; 
“As a consequence [of excessive caseloads], defense lawyers are constantly forced to 
violate their oaths as attorneys because their caseloads make it impossible for them to 
practice law as they are required to do according to the profession’s rules. They 
cannot interview their clients properly, effectively seek their pretrial release, file 
appropriate motions, conduct necessary fact investigations, negotiate responsibly with 
the prosecutor, adequately prepare for hearings, and perform countless other tasks 
that normally would be undertaken by a lawyer with sufficient time and resources. 
Yes, the clients have lawyers, but lawyers with crushing caseloads who, through no 
fault of their own, provide second-rate legal services, simply because it is not 
humanly possible for them to do otherwise.”76 
 Studies of indigent defense systems across the country showed that 73% of the county 
based public defense systems lacked enough attorneys to meet these standards. 77  For 
state wide offices, 15/19 or 79% of the reporting offices exceeded these recommended 
caseload limits and as a whole indigent defense offices had a median of 67% of the 
attorneys necessary to meet these guidelines. 78 One study of these excessive caseloads 
concluded that “As a consequence [of excessive caseload] even the best-intentioned 
lawyers cannot render competent and effective defense services to all of their clients.” 79  
The high caseloads, excessive hours and low pay in many cases lead to an extremely high 
burnout rate for attorneys with high turnover and lower training for the attorneys that are 
representing clients. 80  Additionally, indigent defense services are almost always 
 
76 Lefstein and Spangenberg, “Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right 
to Counsel.” 
77 Taylor, “System Overload: The Costs of Under- Resourcing Public Defense.” 
78 Taylor. 
79 Lefstein and Spangenberg, “Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right 
to Counsel.” 





disproportionately underfunded compared to their prosecutorial counterparts, very often, 
with prosecutorial offices receiving twice as much funding as their indigent defense 
counterpart. 81   
Figure 1: Funding for Prosecution vs. Indigent Defense Services 
82 
In 2008, local and state governments spent over 200 billion dollars spent on 
criminal justice activities broadly only 4.5 billion dollars was allocated for indigent 
defense services. 83  This statistic shows the fact that even in poorer states, there is an 
excessive amount of funding spent on criminal justice activities and that indigent defense 
services are simply being left behind in the discussions in comparison to the 
prosecutorial, police, and correctional counterparts.  For example, in Mississippi in 2012, 
the poorest state in the country, the state government spent almost 340 million dollars on 




83 Pfaff, Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration and How to Achieve Real Reform. 
84 Herberman, “State Government Indigent Defense Expenditures, FY 2008–2012 - Updated”; Mississippi 





 This disparity in funding means that prosecutors can charge and follow through 
with vastly more cases than the indigent defense services can keep up with leading these 
attorneys to seek out and resort to plea deals to settle the vast majority of their cases. 85  A 
study of indigent defense services found that 95% of cases handled by these services end 
up closing the case with a plea deal. 86  Plea deals have seen a dramatic rise in the United 
States in recent years a trend explained by the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers as;  
“Guilty pleas have replaced trials for a very simple reason: individuals who 
choose to exercise their Sixth Amendment right to trial face exponentially higher 
sentences if they invoke the right to trial and lose…This [trial] penalty is now so 
severe and pervasive that it has virtually eliminated the constitutional right to a 
trial. To avoid the penalty, accused persons must surrender many other 
fundamental rights which are essential to a fair justice system.” 87 
These plea deals take less time for the defense attorneys and generally result in less 
prison time for defendants and are much easier for prosecutors so many parties do push 
for them. 88  The problem then becomes that defendants (regardless of if they have 
actually committed a crime or not) have a criminal record, which often leads to a cycle of 
criminality. 89 In California for instance, a guilty plea can become one of three strikes 
which can prevent future employment often pushing people to be further entangled with 
the criminal justice system. 90  The more time per case for prosecution offices also allows 
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them to decide which cases they wish to push towards trial, which they wish to leverage 
plea deals more aggressively with and which cases they wish to drop the charges for 
completely. 91  Indigent defense offices do not have this luxury, they must defend all 
cases that prosecutors have brought charges for and because of the overwhelming 
caseloads often do not have to luxury of time to look into what cases have a viable trial 
defense and which must resort to a plea deal. 92  One narrative study of a county in 
Georgia saw only one public defender for the entire county who sustained a private 
practice as well. 93  The author saw this attorney plead out 48 cases in a row for this 
relatively small county of only about 20,000 people. 94  This pressure to take a plea deal 
for clients can lead to people agreeing to staggering fines, jail time, and a permanent 
record that could be avoided with lower caseloads for indigent defense attorneys. 95 
 This disparity between prosecutorial offices and indigent defense services extends 
beyond the pure funding.  The most pressing example is the presence (or in many more 
cases lack thereof) of investigators. 96  Prosecutorial offices do not have to hire or retain 
investigators to build a case to present at trial. 97  These resources come built into the 
justice system as the police officers, sheriffs, and other law enforcement services work 
closely with prosecutors.  98  Indigent defense services in order to build a case however, 
must hire and retain their own investigators. 99  In fact, 87% of small public defense 
 













offices do not have a full-time investigator on staff.  100  This inability to find evidence to 
build a case again leads to the high propensity for recommending plea deals to clients as 
well as a further disparity between prosecutors and indigent defense services. 101   
I worked as an intern at the Office of the Public Defender in Rockville, Maryland 
and I was hired as an investigative intern for the office. My cohort and I were sent, with 
very little training, to collect witness statements, issue subpoenas, and check alibis to help 
the attorneys build cases but the office did not retain a full-time investigator and instead 
relied on undergraduate interns. While police officers have to be admitted to and graduate 
from the police academy for their training as investigators my cohort and I were only 
given a week of very basic investigator training to serve the same function on the defense 
side.  
Figure 2: Indigent Defense Services Offices with Investigators 
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 Beyond investigators, indigent defense services may even lack the resources to 
communicate effectively with their clients.  All offices are required to provide in court 
interpreters for indigent clients, but this does not always extend to the conversations that 
are necessary to be had outside of court itself. 103  While working at the Office of the 
Public Defender, I also worked as a Spanish language interpreter for the attorneys and 
their clients.  In Montgomery County, 41.5% of the population speaks a language other 
than English and the office does not retain a full-time translator for any language. 104  
Again, this responsibility was left to myself and some of the other undergraduate interns 
and law clerks, most of whom did not have formal translation training.  
 Finally, the availability of other support personnel has been shown to be 
extremely necessary to be able to provide effective criminal defense for indigent defense 
services. 105  The introduction of a social worker in the defense process has been shown 
to greatly reduce the likelihood of recidivism and excessive prison time for clients of 
indigent defense services. 106  Social workers lower this risk as they direct clients of 
indigent defense services to mental health and substance abuse programs instead of only 
incarceration which can assist in addressing the problems at the root of crimes committed 
as opposed to simply wielding a retributive stick at people convicted of crimes. 107 This 
referral to mental health and substance abuse programs has been shown to save 
government spending down the line, “Kentucky implemented such a program [social 
worker program] and found that social workers saved the state 3.25 dollars in criminal 
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justice costs for every 1 dollar in social worker salaries.  Social service workers in Rhode 
Island saved the state 15 million dollars.” 108  This statistic shows the staggering amount 
of money that could be saved by state governments by simply providing funding for 
support personnel in indigent defense offices.  
 
The Political Reality of Indigent Defense Funding 
 While there have been many issues found in the literature surrounding indigent 
defense services, the findings of these studies have not been shown to change the political 
popularity of funding for these services.  Though all people could most likely recite the 
Miranda rights given to people arrested in the United States including the right to an 
attorney, not all support increasing funding indigent defense services.  A 2000 study 
found that only two-thirds of respondents said that attorneys should be provided for the 
poor, a statistic in direct odds with the supreme court mandate for free legal services for 
indigent clients. 109  Furthermore, only 17% of the respondents believed that funding 
should be increased for indigent defense services and this number rose to only 33% after 
some discussion of the issue. 110 This discussion of the issue of funding indigent defense 
services involved informing respondents of the current state of indigent defense including 
the number of criminal defendants who cannot afford private legal representation and 
dramatic underfunding of the offices attempting to meet this demand. 111  Another study 
found that the level of funding for welfare programs was not a predictor of funding and 
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support for Indigent defense offices. 112  This is surprising considering that funding for 
welfare programs could be comparable to the support for funding for indigent defense 
services. 113  Additionally, support for the politics of the “punitive turn” (the trend 
towards mass incarceration and harsher punishments in the criminal justice system) 
predict less support for indigent defense. 114 This inability to find political factors that 
predict support for funding for indigent defense creates a problem for studying the 
motivations for state legislatures to recommend increases or decreases in funding for 
indigent defense services.   
 
Mass Incarceration Rates 
 Unlike indigent defense services, mass incarceration does have a large backing of 
academic studies and is likewise much more discussed in popular media and civil rights 
movements.  It is however very related to the study of indigent defense.  Many studies of 
prison populations have found that roughly 75 percent of people incarcerated were 
indigent when they stood trial. 115  This dramatic number shows how any discussion of 
reducing the incarcerated population must inherently involve a discussion of the funding 
provided for and the quality of our indigent defense services.   
History of Mass Incarceration 
 The general population of the United States accounts for less than five percent of 
the world’s total, but more than twenty percent of the world’s total prison population is 
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claimed by the United States. 116  This massive and unproportionate number has not, 
however, always been the case. 117  Between 1940 and 1975 the prison population in the 
United States hovered around 100 incarcerated people per 100,000 of the total 
population. 118  With the introduction of policies of the Nixon Administration and other 
administrations following the rate of incarcerated people exploded to an average of 500 
people incarcerated per 100,000 by the 2000’s. 119  Policies like mandatory minimums, 
broken windows policing, and the War on Drugs contributed to this explosion of 
incarceration which overwhelmingly impacts low income people and people of color.  In 
the same polls of the incarcerated population, per 100,000 people the incarceration rate of 
Black Americans is 2,207, of Latinx Americans is 966, and of White Americans the rate 
is only 380. 120  For low income persons, in 2014, the median income of incarcerated 
people was 19,185 dollars prior to their incarceration, 41% less than those who are not 
incarcerated. 121  Despite their stated purpose of reducing crime however, these policies 
have done little to impact the overall crime rates in the United States. 122  In fact, there 
have been many studies that suggest the opposite. 123  Instead of reducing crime, the fact 
of someone spending time in prison can be shown to increase the likelihood of recidivism 
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Figure 3: Incarceration rates since 1925 
125 
 
Current State of Mass Incarceration 
 Currently, the overcriminalization of petty offenses leads to higher arrest and 
incarceration rates across the country. 126  The United States spends 79 billion dollars 
annually on corrections which averages to 31,286 dollars spent annually per prisoner 
within the criminal justice system. 127  Additionally, the private interests that control 
much of the prison system have a vested interest in continuing the growth of the prison 
population. 128  For profit prisons create a market for incarcerated people that creates a 
culture of quota meeting in order to fill prison beds in order to generate more capital for 
those that control the prisons. 129 Beyond the monetary incentives of for profit prisons, 
the issue of prison gerrymandering presents another incentive for lawmakers to keep the 
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prison populations high. 130  Prison gerrymandering is the process of lawmakers deciding 
(despite the fact that incarcerated individuals in most places are disenfranchised) where 
the population of prisons is counted for the drawing of district boundaries, a process 
highly reminiscent of the three-fifths compromise. 131  The question for this issue is 
whether incarcerated individuals should be counted as living at their most recent address 
before they were incarcerated or if their address should be recorded as the prison they are 
incarcerated in. 132  The motivation for the latter is that prisoners (most of whom are 
people of color who tend to vote more liberal) would be removed from the cities that they 
generally live in to rural areas creating many more districts in rural areas which would 
otherwise not exist. 133  A study of Pennsylvania districts found that eight congressional 
districts would not meet federal population requirements if they had not counted 
incarcerated individuals in that district. 134  
 
Indigent Defense Funding and Mass Incarceration 
 Currently, an average of 80% of people that are charged with a crime in the 
United States are eligible for indigent defense services. 135  This number varies greatly 
nationally however.  For example, in Wisconsin, over 93% of people that are arrested are 
eligible for a public defender. 136  
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Figure 4: Annual incomes of incarcerated and non- incarcerated men 
 
137 
Despite this massive link between people requiring indigent defense services and the 
representation of low income people in the prison population, there have not been any 
empirical studies on the relationship between funding for indigent defense services and 
mass incarceration.   
 There have, however, been pieces written by scholars of criminal justice 
regarding this relationship. 138  One article found that “In 2008, for every dollar spent on 
public defense, taxpayers spend nearly 14 on corrections.” 139  Scholars have found that 
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the lack of quality defense can lead to longer pre-trial defense for those who cannot 
afford the cash bail required to be removed from pretrial detention. 140  Additionally, 
scholars have found that the lack of quality defense can lead to excessive prison 
sentences for defendants. 141  The increase in guilty plea bargains that accompanied 
increased charges and excessive caseloads for public defense have led to prosecutors 
proposing slightly reduced sentences for guilty pleas but for the small proportion of cases 
that do go to trial defendants, if found guilty, are given excessive prison sentences. 142  
The articles surrounding these topics together propose higher funding for public defense 
as a solution for mass incarceration but do not have an empirical backing to them. 143 
 
Gaps in the Literature 
 The largest gap in the literature as it stands is the fact that there is no empirical 
study on the link between the levels of funding for public defense and the rates of 
incarceration for those communities.  Across the board however, there is a surprisingly 
low number of studies that concern indigent defense funding.  There are no studies that 
cover the degrees of efficacy of different indigent defense implementation systems. 144 
There is also a dearth in literature regarding political culture surrounding indigent defense 
funding and popular support for it.  This lack of literature could be partially explained by 
the relative novelty of mandated indigent defense services across the country.  Though 
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the ruling in Gideon came out in 1963, its full implementation across the country took 
many years to come to fruition.  Additionally, once it was a relatively fleshed out system, 
the people in need of or impacted by these systems and services are generally those that 
are thought of as undesirable in the United States i.e. low income people, people of color, 
and those convicted of crimes.  All people that academic writing often forgets about.  
Finally for indigent defense services, it is necessary to study the reasons for these chronic 
underfunding and the policies that must be put in place to improve the system as a whole.  
 With regards to mass incarceration, more research is needed on the political 
atmosphere surrounding mass incarceration and how that plays into the future of certain 





Chapter 3: Methods  
 The previous chapter outlined the existing literature surrounding indigent defense 
services, incarceration rates, and the small amount of literature on the relationship 
between the two.  However there persist a large gap in this literature.  For the most part, 
there is very little research on indigent defense services as a whole and the impact that 
these services can have on the lives of the people and communities that they represent.  
Because of this gap, this study attempts to answer the following question: what impact 
does the level of funding for indigent defense services have on incarceration rates?  
 This chapter will address the methodology that will be used to test this question.  I 
will first list my hypotheses and arrow diagrams depicting this relationship.  I will also 
discuss the cases I will be looking at to test this hypothesis.  I will then list and describe 
major and control variables and the ways in which each of these variables will be 
operationalized.  Finally, I will describe the methodology and justification for this 
method for testing the relationship between these variables. 
 
Hypotheses 
H1: Increased funding for indigent defense services lowers rates of incarceration in the 
communities that these services represent. 
Hnull: The level of funding for public defense will have no impact on incarceration rates of 















The level of funding for indigent defense services is my independent variable and 
the incarceration rate is the dependent, with the other control variables being entered in as 
a part of my test.   
 
Case Selection 
 I will be looking at information from 49 states and all of the counties in 
Pennsylvania.  I will not be including Alaska in my study because their funding level is 
almost double the next highest per capita funding for indigent defense services.  In 2018, 
the Alaska House Finance committee approved a measure to increase funding for their 
public defense department by 1 million dollars in order to bring the caseloads of the 
public defender’s office closer to the American Bar Association standards. 145 There is 
not a discernable difference between Alaska and other states with much less funding 
allocated to indigent defense, only the fact that members of the Alaska House Finance 
Committee cited an ethical obligation to increasing funding for the Public Defender 
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Agency. 146  Because Alaska is so different from the other states in this respect it could 
negatively affect the statistical significance of the data from the other states and not show 
the trend of the data nationally to an accurate degree.   
 I will be looking at the data from all of the counties in Pennsylvania for a few 
reasons.  First, as stated in the previous chapter, Pennsylvania is the only state that leaves 
funding and implementation of the mandate from Gideon of providing indigent clients 
legal services completely to each of the counties.  There is no statewide oversight or 
funding given to the county governments which is sharply different from every other 
state in the country.  Second, the demographic and urban makeup of Pennsylvania is very 
representative of the rest of the United States as a whole.  The racial and age breakdown 
of Pennsylvania is very comparable to the United states a whole as shown by the chart 
below.  Additionally, using Pennsylvania as a case study will give information on many 
different implementation systems within similar demographic groups, thus showing the 
impact of funding across the board.  Finally, focusing in on one state can create a more 
reliable study as it controls for a generally similar attitude towards criminal justice within 
one state, which is virtually impossible within the scope of this study when studying a 
country of 330 million people.   
 





Figure 6: Racial and age breakdown of Pennsylvania vs The United States 
147 
Additionally, Pennsylvania is home to two relatively large cities as well as a good 
representation of rural and suburban areas.  Finally, having a more granular view of 
funding disparities between urban, suburban, and rural communities can improve upon 
the legitimacy and external validity of this study.   
 
Independent and Dependent Variables 
Level of Funding for Indigent Defense Services 
 For this variable I will be looking at the per capita funding awarded to indigent 
defense services for both groups.  Indigent defense funding is defined as the 
constitutionally mandated free legal services to those accused of crimes who cannot 
afford it. 148  I will be looking at indigent defense funding across all of the 
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implementation methods (staffed public defenders, contract attorneys, assigned counsel, 
and mixed or county based systems). 149  This allows for this study to not be biased 
towards or against any state that has mixed implementation systems as it records the 
funding across the board.  Though there have been so few studies that deal with indigent 
defense services this information was readily available thanks to the information 
provided by the organization “Gideon at 50” and reports by WHYY the Philadelphia 
NPR station. 150  Operationalization of this variable is simple as it is not necessary to 
convert the variable to a testable number.   
 
Incarceration Rates 
 For the 49 states, I will be looking at the incarceration rates published by the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics from 2016. 151  This data recorded every person that was a 
part of the incarcerated population in 2016 at every level (including jails). 152  In order to 
operationalize this data I will look at the rate of incarcerated people per 100,000 people 
that are not incarcerated.  This will enable me to not have to control for the total 
population of the state.  Additionally, it is widely agreed in the literature that this is one 
of the most effective way of measuring incarceration rates. 153 The other option for this 
variable would be to look at the incarceration rate per crime committed. 154  Because of 
the limited timeline and scope of this study as well as the wide variation of crime rates 
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across the United States the incarceration rate per 100,000 people is the most applicable 
measure for this study. 155 
 For the Pennsylvania counties, collecting data on incarceration rates gets more 
complicated.  Each of the counties does not publish how many people it incarcerates or it 
sends to prisons from their justice systems.  Therefore, I decided to calculate what each 
county’s share of Pennsylvania’s total incarceration rate ought to be based on other 
available statistics of their justice systems.  In order to do this, I found the total number of 
plea deals that came out of each county as this is the closest statistic to conviction rates 
that was available.  I then added all of these numbers together and determined the 
percentage of the total that each county is responsible for.  I then apportioned that same 
percentage to the total incarceration rate of Pennsylvania and attributed the resulting 
number to each county rounding to the nearest whole number for each county.  There is 
general agreeance in the literature that the rise in the number of plea deals (which is 
widely attributed to the unequal funding and legal representation between prosecutors 
and indigent defense services) has increased incarceration across the board as well so I 
believe this to be a good surrogate for the incarceration numbers themselves. 156  With 
these numbers for Pennsylvania, they will not be reported as the number of incarcerated 
people per 100,000 not incarcerated as many of these countries do not meet this threshold 
100,000 people as a baseline and cannot therefore be put in that comparison.  Because of 
this, I will control for the population of each county in Pennsylvania when running the 
test.   
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 For the 49 states and granular view of Pennsylvania that I will be testing I will 
look at various control variables in order to ensure the external validity of this study.   
The first group is the racial demographic controls.  All literature concerning the 
United States criminal justice system acknowledges the fact that people of color are 
disproportionately affected by the system compared to their white counterparts and it is 
therefore necessary to control for these factors the racial groups.  These groups that I 
have identified are the racial groups that the census asks about including; White, Black, 
American Indian or Alaskan native, Asian, Native Hawaiian, two or more races, and 
Latinx. 157   
I will also control for the economic factors that are so prevalent in their effect on 
the system i.e. the poverty and per capita income of every state and county.  Specifically, 
for the Pennsylvania counties I will also control for the median household price as listed 
on Zillow. 158  Much of where counties get their budget from is based on the property 
taxes they collect.  Because the property taxes in each of the counties can vary so much 
based on the housing prices it is necessary to control for the housing prices as it can be an 
indication of the property taxes that the county can collect. 159 
 Additionally, I will attempt to control for the level of punitiveness of the 
prosecutorial and police systems.  A less punitive prosecutorial force and the rise of 
progressive prosecutors mainly in cities has reduced the incarceration rates of those 
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communities as prosecutors lean towards less punitive sentences and sentence 
recommendations for communities. 160  John Pfaff, one of the leading scholars concerning 
criminal justice reform particularly with reference to indigent defense services,  
emphasized the fact that prosecutors have an extreme amount of power in criminal trials 
and this power must be controlled for in order to ensure the external validity of this 
study.161  In order to control for this, I will record the percentage of the state and county 
that voted for Donald Trump as president.  This can be used as a surrogate for the 
percentage of the state and county that would lean very conservative and the amount of 
people that would support more harsh sentences for people who have been convicted of 
crimes particularly when the sentences would impact people of color. 162   
Additionally, I will look into if the state or county has any elected judges.  Elected 
judges tend to lean towards more harsh sentences as a reelection technique. 163  Finally, 
for this measure I will be looking at the percentage of charges dropped in each state and 
county as a measure of the willingness for prosecutors to be lenient on underserving 
charges or sentences.  For this variable I will look at whether or not there are any elected 
judges present in the state as reported by Ballotpedia.164  For operationalization, I will 
code the presence of elected judges as 0 and non-elected judges as 1.  All of the judicial 
positions in Pennsylvania are selected by partisan election so there is no need to control 
for this variable.165 
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 I will be testing this question using a multivariate regression analysis in SPSS.  
Because the relationship between these variables has never been tested empirically, I 
wanted to be able to use a relatively simple test and method to be able to establish a 
baseline for future testing.  I will look for statistically significant results that move in a 
negative direction as a sign of confirmation of my hypothesis and rejection of the null. I 
will also be using a multivariate regression as the variables I will be using are continuous 
as opposed to discrete or categorical.  
 
Conclusion 
 This study will analyze the impact that levels of funding for indigent defense 
services has on incarceration by running a multivariate regression and controlling for the 
variables listed above.  The control variables will attempt to serve as a control for the 












Chapter 4: Results and Discussion 
 The previous chapters outlined the current state of the literature regarding this 
question and the methodology that I would use to test the question and hypothesis.  This 
chapter will go on to discuss the results of the multivariate regression.  First I will restate 
my hypothesis and arrow diagrams and how they relate to the information I was able to 
collect.  I will then display the results of the regressions I ran and the implications of 
those results.  Finally, I will then briefly discuss the limitations of those results.  
 
Hypotheses 
As I stated in the previous chapter because there have been no empirical tests 
done on the question of this study (What affect does the level of funding for indigent 
defense services have on incarceration rates?) this study seeks to establish a baseline 
relationship between the two variables.  Keeping that in mind, the hypotheses for this test 
are: 
H1: Increased funding for indigent defense services lowers rates of incarceration in the 
communities that these services represent. 
Hnull: The level of funding for indigent defense services will have no impact on 
incarceration rates of the communities that these services represent. 
















I will divide the results by the two analyses I ran with one section on the 49 state 
analysis and one on the Pennsylvania county analysis.  Because these two tests needed to 
have different control variables and different numbers for incarceration rate and levels of 
funding for indigent defense the results must be viewed as having been run separately but 
the implications of those results discussed together.   
 
49 State Analysis 
I began this study with a simple analysis of the basic relationship between the 
level of funding for indigent defense services and incarceration rates.  
 
Figure 8: 49 State Indigent defense funding and incarceration (no controls) 












This test preliminarily confirmed my hypothesis of the negative relationship 
between indigent defense funding and incarceration rate but it did not include any of the 
controls necessary to improve the external validity of the study.  This does show that I 
can expect to find a negative relationship between the main variables, preliminarily 
confirming the relationship I expected to see in my hypothesis.  
Next, I ran a test with the controls that I believed would be the most significant in 
determining the relationship between the two variables.  These include the Black 
population, latinx population, and the percentage of the population that identifies as two 
or more races.  I also controlled for the poverty rate as well as if the state has any elected 
judges or not.  
Figure 9: 49 State indigent defense funding and incarceration with controls 





 Though this test would prove more generalizable due to the presence of the 
control variables, the results are not statistically significant.  Despite the fact that they do 
not meet this .05 threshold of statistical significance, they are still moving in a negative 
direction giving an indication that my hypothesis for the state level analysis could still be 
confirmed in some future study.   
 
Pennsylvania County Data 
 For the analysis of the Pennsylvania data I followed similar steps to the 49 state 
analysis.  First I ran a simple test with only the first two variables while controlling for 
the total population of each of the counties because the incarceration rate was not given 
as the number of people incarcerated per 100,000 but instead solely the number of 
incarcerated people total.  
 
Figure 10: Pennsylvania indigent defense funding and incarceration without controls 
 
This test was markedly more significant and successful than the 49 state analysis 





significant results I can expect a confirmation of the negative relationship I expected in 
my hypothesis.  I next ran an analysis with the racial demographic control variables for 
each of these counties.  These include the Black population, Latinx population, and the 
population that identifies as two or more races.  I also included controls for the median 
household price in order to control for the property taxes that each county can collect.  In 
order to control for the punitive levels of the prosecution and police force I added a 
variable for the percentage of the cases dismissed by the prosecution.  In conversations 
with experts in studying indigent defense services agree that this can be an effective 
surrogate measure for the punitive levels in counties. 166 
 
Figure 11:Pennsylvania indigent defense funding and incarceration with controls  
 






This test led to an extremely high level of significance in the expected direction of 
a negative relationship.  From this we can understand that in Pennsylvania there is 
enough data to reject the null hypothesis and the direction of the relationship is confirmed 
for the other 49 states.  We can assume that because of the higher number of cases as well 
as a more consistent attitude towards criminal justice as it is only studying 12 million 
people compared to the 330 million of the United States as a whole.    
While these data represent a very preliminary dive into the answer to the question 
of what effect levels of funding for indigent defense services has on incarceration rates it 
does give an indication towards the impact that adequate funding for indigent legal 
services can have on dampening the magnitude of the mass incarceration crisis in the 






Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 The aim of this study was to establish if there is a linear relationship between the 
level of funding spent on indigent defense services and the rate of incarceration in those 
communities.  This study focused on two specific groups of communities, the state-wide 
funding and the county level funding for Pennsylvania specifically.  For the state-wide 
funding I took the aggregate per capita funding provided to all indigent defense services 
and compared that to the incarceration rate per 100,000 people in each state.  For the 
county level data for Pennsylvania I looked to the total funding provided for indigent 
defense and the total number of people incarcerated and controlled for the total 
population as there is such a disparity in population size and income levels across 
Pennsylvania.   
I hypothesized that the higher the level of funding for indigent defense, the lower 
the rate of incarceration.  I based this hypothesis on the idea that higher funding for 
indigent defense leads to these services having more access to more attorneys, 
investigators, and social workers which allows for public defenders to be better 
opponents to prosecutors which could cause lower incarceration rates as it creates shorter 
sentences as well as fewer wrongful convictions.  My hypothesis was partially confirmed 
and partially not.  The data for Pennsylvania was statistically significant in the negative 
direction confirming this hypothesis.  For the other 49 states however, the results were 
not statistically significant but did move in a negative direction confirming that there is 
some measure of a negative relationship between the variables of levels of funding for 







 Due to limitations of time, there are a few drawbacks that could affect the 
reliability of this study.  First, there is not a great variety of literature on which to base 
this study.  Because there has not been a wide variety of studies on indigent defense as a 
topic it was difficult to come up with variables with a high level of external validity as 
they are mostly based on opinion pieces and interviews I have done.   
 Second, there is not a direct significant relationship in both groups of variables.  
Though this can be used to indicate the direction of the relationship of the variables it 
cannot definitively say that there is a relationship.  Though Pennsylvania can indicate a 
statistically significant relationship, because it is limited to one state we cannot say that 
there is a universal claim to be made.  The fact of statistical significance only for 
Pennsylvania could potentially be explained by the fact that there can be assumed a 
generally consistent view towards the criminal justice system.  Though there may be a 
great variation in political opinions across the state the attitudes towards prosecution and 
policing is generally a more consistent attitude across communities and could lead to a 
more reliable result in a way that would be difficult to control for. 167   
 Third, it is difficult to control for all of the factors that can affect incarceration 
rates as well as funding for indigent defense services.  As with many social science 
questions it is difficult to make any sweeping claims and control for every factor.  This is 
especially true in fields such as criminal justice where the field is changing so much and 
in many cases is very subject to the opinions of prosecutors and local government 
officials. 
 






Suggestions for Future Research 
 In order to rectify the limitations of this study there are a few suggestions for 
future research of this question.   
 First, it would be effective for a future study to utilize time series data to test the 
same question.  In this study, I would take the same variables used in this study and apply 
a test over a series of years.  This study would be able to account for the change of 
funding for indigent defense services as well as changes in policies that can contribute to 
higher arrest rates and incarceration.   
 Second, it would be beneficial to interview and observe individual offices across 
the country.  This would have a twofold benefit for assisting in the better understanding 
of this research question.  First, it would give the ability to learn about the individual 
differences in every indigent defense office which can affect case outcomes.  Second, this 
individualized attention to certain communities would give the opportunity to better 
control for the punitive culture of those communities.  This study made preliminary steps 
to control for the level of punitiveness coming from prosecutorial and police offices but 
further studies would benefit greatly from having more focused and individualized 
interview based data on this factor.   
The Promise of Gideon 
 The promise of Gideon was simple, ensure a fair trial for every person accused of 
a crime with the availability of free legal services to indigent clients.  The reality has 
become very different, with clients waiting years for trial, attorneys having seven minutes 





 There is one specific instance that shows this inequity in legal representation 
between prosecution and indigent defense services being rectified.  In 2018, the Alaskan 
Public Defender went to the Alaskan House Finance Committee chairman and presented 
evidence of the dramatic state of overwork in the Alaskan Public Defender’s office. 168  
He stated, “There’s a principal of ethics that requires a lawyer not to accept a case if they 
can’t competently handle that case, and not having enough time would be that reason so, 
we would attempt to refuse cases.” 169  The Alaskan House Finance Committee after 
hearing this evidence and reading the caseload standards from the American Bar 
Association allocated one million extra dollars for new attorneys in order to meet the 
national standards and making Alaska such an outlier for per capita indigent defense 
spending. 170  
 Alaska is not a state that is usually seen as a leader in criminal justice reform but 
they made a crucial, logical, choice to fund their indigent defense services adequately in 
order to meet the recommended caseload standards.  Though this happened too recently 
to know what the impact of this extra funding will have on the incarceration rate, the 
findings in this study indicate that in coming years, the incarceration rate will decrease 
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Figure 1: Funding for Prosecution vs. Indigent Defense Services 
 
Figure 2: Indigent Defense Services Offices with Investigators 










Figure 3: Incarceration rates since 1925 
 
Figure 4: Annual incomes of incarcerated and non- incarcerated men 







































Figure 8: 49 State Indigent defense funding and incarceration (no controls) 
 















Figure 11:Pennsylvania indigent defense funding and incarceration with controls  
 
